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The reason-based approach helps explain why individual cases and individual teachings can justify analogies. It also explains what is correct in the principles-based approach, as some of the considerations underlying similar cases will be principles. But there are more legal considerations than principles, and these also play a role in analogous argumentation. On the other hand, there are arguments of equality where, in the original case, the General Court was faced with a situation in which the correct result was uncertain, that is to say, in which several results were possible in the light of the legally admissible arguments. This may be because each outcome is also well supported by reason, or because the results are supported by different and immeasurable values. In some of these cases, there are closure rules in the law to settle the case, for example: in favor of the defendants, but in other cases, there are no closing rules for the appropriate material outcome that must be approved. A possible example of such vagueness is the position of a person who innocently buys stolen goods. In some jurisdictions, the buyer acquires the right ownership of these goods, while in others (such as the common law) they do not. Here, the merits of both innocent parties (the buyer and the original owner) are arguably the same, and all the law can do is decide which one should prevail.

Thus, if an outcome is undetermined, there are arguments of equality for subsequent courts after the previous decision, rather than adopting one of the other possible solutions. None of this, of course, is an argument for following previous decisions that were badly decided, since these are cases where the previous court did not err but chose an admissible option. The precedent and the analogy are two central and complementary forms of legal argumentation. What makes it characteristic of legal reasoning are the circumstances of decision-making in law. The greatest contrast is in individual reasoning, where neither precedent nor analogy have the same meaning. A person may give weight to what they have done in the past, for example, because they believe the decision was made under optimal conditions, or because they should not or do not want to disappoint someone`s expectations, or because there are special reasons to treat both situations identically. Similarly, comparing the problem in question with another situation can help clarify one`s own thinking, but the judgment on the other case is relevant only to the extent that it is correct. However, the second difficulty applies to both versions of this approach, namely the consideration of the role played by rations. The practice of precedent is that subsequent courts are required to follow or distinguish the earlier decision, but only if the facts of the last case fall within the relationship. The relationship plays an indispensable role in determining the extent of the subsequent court`s obligation to comply or distinguish – only if the facts of the subsequent case fall within the relationship does this question arise. This role is not adequately captured by arguing that it is the justifications, not the relationship, that are binding.

[12] (cf. Moore 1987, 185-7, 211-3). What the approach, on the other hand, highlights is the role that the justification of decisions plays in the practice of precedent. As we have already mentioned, the determination of the relationship is not a mechanical exercise: it is a question of understanding what has been decided in a case – with reference to what has been said in the judgment, in previous cases and in the general understanding of this area of law. The justification for the precedent of its decision plays an important role in determining the degree of abstraction of the factors in relation and in presenting arguments in favour of a narrower or broader interpretation of those factors. [13] This interpretation of precedent is supported in legal practice by the distinction between the so-called “ratio decidendi” of a case and the “obiter dicta”. The relationship of a case represents “detention” or “judgment”, i.e. the legal penalty for which the case has jurisdiction – this is the aspect of the case that binds subsequent courts. Obiter dicta, on the other hand, are other statements and opinions expressed in the judgment that are not binding on subsequent courts.

According to this previous view, the rule established in the previous case is represented by the ratio. The use of an earlier court decision as a precedent can be understood as a kind of analogous reasoning. In order to argue that an earlier case should be applied to a present case, it is necessary to highlight the relevant similarities between the two cases. The legal use of analogous reasoning is subject to the same restrictions as in everyday use. It can be analysed and evaluated on the basis of the evaluation criteria of similar arguments for its strengths and weaknesses. On the other hand, analogies carry additional weight in relation to the merits of the case. The courts` approach is complex.